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ABSTRACT 
The relative strength index (RSI) has endured far longer than most other 
technical indicators. Unfortunately, durability does not necessarily equate to 
profitability. Thus the prime objective is to verify the profitability of RSI. 
RSI levels are between zero and one hundred. The higher the RSI, the more the 
market is considered overbought and is expected to retreat downward. The lower the 
RSI, the more the market is considered oversold and should reverse to the upside. 
Based on these principles, we designed the tests on profitability to embrace following 
trading rules. 
1. RSI levels over 70 are considered overbought and hence sell signals. 
2. RSI levels under 30 are considered oversold and hence buy signals. 
3. A buy decision is considered successful if the stock price rises the next day. 
A sell trade is considered successful if the stock price drops one day after the 
sell signal. 
4. Abnormal returns are calculated and hypothesis testing is performed to draw 
conclusion on the significance of positive (and negative) abnormal returns. 
5. All A-shares and B-shares in the China's equity market are covered and the 
testing period is limited to 3 years from January 1, 1999 to December 31, 
2001. 
i i i 
The results are heuristic: For A-share markets, buy signals cannot help beating the 
market. Sell signals do generate abnormal returns. For B-share markets, buy signals 
work but sell signals result in significant negative abnormal returns. Higher abnormal 
returns in B-share markets for buy signals are probably due to the announcement of 
deregulation of the B-share markets in February 2001. This impact of relaxation of 
trading restriction is proved to be true by additional tests on the abnormal returns for 
the period before and the period after February 1，2001. The big difference in the 
abnormal returns between these two periods hints the importance of the role played by 
change in investing environment on technical trading profits. Finally, we tried to find 
out other factors that can enhance our trading model. "Market value" and "volume 
turnover" are chosen for hypothesis testing on their correlations with abnormal return. 
Although no significant correlation can be found, there is still much room for fiirther 
studies on this topic. 
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Of the two approaches that are usually used to seek profits from trading stocks, 
more and more investment analysts prefer technical analysis to fiindamental analysis. 
Despite the criticism on lacking theoretical support by the academics, the popularity 
of technical analysis can be attributed to its simplicity in application. For example, 
technical analysts solely need to study price charts without detailed analysis of 
financial statements and many other non-quantifiable factors (e.g. investors' attitude 
towards the industry, employee training and loyalty, etc) which carry impact on stock 
price movements. Regardless of which approaches are deployed, it is proven by many 
empirical researches that they work well only when the efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH) of capital market does not hold. Therefore, it would not be surprising to find 
profitable to use technical analysis in some emerging capital markets which are 
usually less informationally efficient. China's equity market, which is characterized 
by shallow investor base of retail type and stringent restrictions on stock ownership, 
would be a potential candidate for verifying the lucrative assertion of technical 
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analysis. Relative strength index of technical analysis is chosen as a testing tool. 
Technical Analysis 
Technical analysis is essentially the search for recurrent and predictable patterns 
in stock prices. According to Murphy (1999)^ there are three premises on which the 
technical approach is based: 
1. Market action discounts everything. 
2. Prices move in trends. 
3. History repeats itself. 
The second and third premises explain the possibility and need to search for 
recognizable patterns but the first premise is similar to EMH that stock price fiilly 
reflects all the currently information about that security. The difference here lies in the 
timeliness. Efficient capital market assumes any new information that can possibly 
affect price - fundamentally, politically, psychologically, or otherwise - is instantly 
reflected in the price. But the technical analysts, though affirm the significance of 
information regarding future economic prospect of a firm on stock price, believe that 
analyzing the impact of such information on firm's value is not necessary for a 
successfully trading strategy. This is because whatever the fundamental reasons for a 
1 Murphy, John J. Technical Analysis of the Financial Markets. ed. NJ: New York Institute of 
Finance, 1999, pp. 2-5. 
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change in stock price, if the stock price responds slowly enough, the analysts will be 
able to identify a trend that can be exploited during the adjustment period. The key to 
successful technical analysis is a sluggish response of stock price to fundamental 
supply and demand factors. This is diametrically opposed to the notion of an efficient 
market. 
The Characteristics and Efficiency of China's Equity Markets 
As timely responses of stock prices to reflect current market information are 
crucial to the validity of technical analysis, the market efficiency should be discreetly 
considered. An efficient capital market implies that the current security prices have 
fully reflected all available information. Fama (1970) determines three sufficient 
conditions: 
1. All agree on the implications of the information for the current prices and 
distributions of future prices of each security 
2. No transaction costs in trading securities 
3. All available information is costlessly available to all market participants 
We will discuss each of the above in regard to China's equity markets in an 
attempt to shed light on some major market characteristics and then draw a 
2 Fama, Eugene F. "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Tlieory and Empirical Work." Journal of 
Finance, May 1970，pp. 6-7. 
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preliminary implication on the efficiency. 
Market Participants 
The first assumption is affected by the diversity of market participants in terms 
of investment objectives and constraints (e.g. return objectives, risk tolerance, 
investing horizon, experiences and skills, etc). The smaller the diversity, the more 
rapidly the market participants reach an agreement on and reflect the implication of 
information on current prices. In China, the equity markets are dominated by a large 
number of retail investors with similar objectives (e.g. seeking for short-term profits) 
and constraints (e.g. low risk tolerance, limited investing experiences and immature 
analytical skills, etc). 
Despite the government effort to encourage market participation by both 
domestic and foreign institutional investors (Appendix 1)，99.6 percent of the share 
account holders are retail investors at the end of 1999 (Appendix 2). There are many 
reasons for this situation. The fundamental one rests on the poor qualities of 
companies listed, which worry the institutional investors more since they tend to 
invest long term. More than 90 percent of listed companies are state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) which are usually not efficient users of capital. Money raised from 
IPO by these SOEs may be used for paying workers' wages, taxes and pension 
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schemes. Aggravated these problems are serious corruption, insider dealing and 
severe moral hazard caused by inadequate financial disclosure. Being fiirther 
discouraged by government regulations on currency inconvertibility and restrictions 
on the purchase of A-shares which represent 98 percent of China's listed share issues 
to Chinese nationals�，foreign institutional investors prefer making their China plays 
via Hong Kong listed H-shares or red chips in what are generally perceived as 
higher-quality mainland companies. 
The result is the strictly state-regulated capital markets filled with numerous but 
similar retail investors who are highly sensitive to local news and government 
regulations 4. Extreme market volatility and speculative activities seeking for 
short-term profits are more pronounced in China than in other emerging markets. 
Also, because of apathy of foreign investors in making investments in B-shares 
markets, B-shares are often traded at a quarter of the values of their A-share 
counterparts. 
Transaction Costs and Tradability of Shares 
Frictionless capital markets with zero transaction cost seldom happen in reality. 
3 However, in an effort to increase the depth and liquidity of the market, in October 1999, licensed 
foreign insurers were granted the right to invest in A-share mutual funds. 
4 Howie and Walter (2001) said that, "the [China's capital] market's character reflects the influence of 
two factors: (1) investor sentiment about the country's overall economic performance; and (2) 
government policy (p. 166). 
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This is particularly true in China where the capital markets are imbued with spirit of 
state planning, state control and state interest. 
The transaction costs in China are still high compared with those of Hong Kong^. 
Trading barriers in stocks mainly come from interventions of the Chinese government 
via legal regulations. Among all, the state-owned spirit remains the most unique 
(contradictory also) feature in the transfer of stock ownership system. It is best 
illustrated by Article 4 of China's 1994 Company Law that the ownership rights to 
the company [limited by shares] belong to the State but not the shareholders. 
Therefore, to reinforce the government's control on listed companies, the Standard 
Opinion^ defines the types of shares into state shares, legal person shares, internal 
staff shares, individual shares and foreign shares. Each type of share has different 
regulations governing the right of ownership transfer. Tradable shares only accounts 
for about 30 percent to 35 percent of the market capitalization. The remaining 65 
percent to 70 percent is mainly represented by non-tradable legal person shares and 
state shares (Appendix 3). The State, either directly or indirectly, through the 
holding of these non-tradable shares that its control over the listed companies can be 
maintained. Another example can be seen from the introduction by the government of 
5 For example, as of November 16*^  2001，commission and stamp duty, the two major user charges, are 
0.35 percent and 0.3 percent of transaction value for A-shares and 0.55 percent and 0.2 percent for 
B-shares in China; while those costs in Hong Kong are only 0.25 percent and 0.1 percent of transacticm 
amount 
6 The Standard Opinion and supporting legislation, drafted in 1989 and implemented in 1992, was 
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control on stock price bands of ±10 percent from December 16，1996 when facing 
overheating of stock markets. 
These state-controlled but publicly listed enterprises detract the benefits of public 
ownership of stock and place a significant drag on the reform of the corporate 
management. 
Availability of Information 
Since the operation of invisible seat system was put into trading operation in 
1995 for Shenzhen Stock Exchange and 1997 for Shanghai Stock Exchange, satellite 
links have been set up between the exchange mainframe trading system and brokers' 
offices across the country to facilitate instant trading and receive price and volume 
information for all securities on a real time basis. The information received is usually 
reconfigured by software applications into a more user-friendly format. One such 
system is Qianlong which provides a graphic for each stock and the bid/offer price 
and size for each security. The software also provides historical data and a variety of 
technical analyses. Other software packages include Huijin and JianGong. Most 
trading halls have at least two software packages for investors to analyze exchange 
data. In addition，there is a huge range of television programs, newspapers, magazines, 
aimed at 'standardizing' the helter-skelter approaches of the 1980s to creating shareholding companies. 
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and books discussing the market. In short, obtaining market information is not a 
problem in China. 
However, non-market public information like financial statement disclosures is 
far from satisfactory from the angles of quantity and accuracy. The most likely results 
are severe moral hazard problem and insider trading. Better corporate governance and 
more independent auditing with recognized professional standard are urgently needed 
especially after China's entrance into WTO. 
Implication on Weak Form Market Efficiency 
As technical analysts attempt to predict future prices based on the patterns of past 
price movements，the chance of being profited by using technical tools depends on 
whether weak form efficiency holds. Weak form EMH assumes that current stock 
prices fully reflect all securities-market information, including historical sequence of 
stock price, rate of returns, trading volume and other market-generated information. In 
other words, by the time the market information is public, the price adjustment has 
taken place. Therefore, a purchase or sale using a technical trading rule that uses 
historical market information should not generate abnormal returns after considering 
risk and transaction cost. Our task here is to analyze how the aforementioned market 
conditions affect the efficiency and effectiveness of stock prices responsiveness to 
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securities-market information. Other issues like adequacy of financial disclosures and 
insider trading will not be discussed in this study. 
First, China's capital markets are dominated by a large group of similar retail 
investors. Their similarities in investing background accelerate the process to reach a 
consensus among the market participants. This phenomenon increases the speed for 
their interpretations of market information to be felt on stock prices and enables the 
impact to be more effectively reflected. Moreover, volatility per se is in no way 
inconsistent with efficiency^. A stock in an efficient market should adjust to new 
information by changing price. In truth, the absence of price movements in such 
frequently changing capital markets as the ones in China might suggest inefficiency. 
Second, the existence of transaction costs and barriers as well as volatility limit 
on stock prices would be expected to have negative effect on market efficiency since 
they inhibit the flow of transaction. However, one of the findings by Li and Li (2000)8 
stresses that government interventions (i.e. 土 10 percent limit on price fluctuation) do 
not have a significant impact on the existing level of efficiency. It suggests that 
improving market efficiency is more affected by long run task contingent on 
improvements in infrastructure and has little to do with temporary measures taken by 
7 Ross, Stephen A., Westerfield, Randolph. W. and Jaffe, J. Corporate Finance. 5山 ed. Singapore: 
McGraw-Hill, 1999, p. 325. 
8 Li, Xiaoming, and Li, Wei. "An Empirical Study on Evolving Market Efficiency for China's Stock 
Markets." Working Paper Series No. 0016, Massey University, Auckland, 2000. 
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government for short-run stabilization purposes. 
Third, the easy access to market information and instant trading facilitated 
through satellite link enhance the speed at which new information be reflected in 
stock prices. 
But even if transaction costs, information that is not freely available to investors 
and disagreement among investors about implications of given information were to 
exist in China's capital markets, they would not necessarily be the sources of market 
inefficiency but the potential sources only. In fact, all three occur to some extent in 
every market. Measurement of their effects on the process on price formation, is of 
course, one of the goals of our research. Equivalently saying, if we can consistently 
and statistically achieve significant abnormal return by using relative strength index 
in trading stocks, we can conclude that the China's capital markets are not weak form 
efficient. 
Relative Strength Index 
Relative Strength Index (RSI) is an oscillator first introduced by J. Welles Wilder, 
Jr. in the June 1978 issue of Commodities (now known as Futures) magazine, later in 
his book New Concepts in Technical Trading. RSI measures the strength of any 
trading vehicle by monitoring changes in its closing prices. It is a leading or a 
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coincident indicator. 
RS Average of x days' up closes for a selected number of days 
Average of x days' down closes for a same number of days 
RSI is plotted on a vertical scale of 0 to 100. Usually, movement above 70 is 
considered overbought and a sell order should be placed, while a move below 30 is 
oversold and one should buy the stock. The RSI's objective is to measure the 
relative strength of a trend for use in forecasting its possible continuation or reversal. 
The concept of RSI is based on the assumption that after a strong rally the overbought 
market will enter into a downward correction phase. The opposite holds true as well. 
After a strong fall, RSI will give an oversold index; presumably this presages a rally. 
RSI tries to measure the extent of these overbought and oversold conditions in order 




Limited literature has been researched on testing the profitability of RSI in the 
China's stock markets. However, separate studies on technical analysis in both mature 
and emerging markets, China's stock market efficiency, and profitability of stock 
trading based on RSI in the U.S. equity markets, are abounding. 
Abundant researches have been conducted in the U.S. equity markets using stock 
prices or other market data like odd-lot figures, advance-decline ratios, short sales, 
short position, and specialist activities^. Most of the studies suggested that these 
trading rules generally would not outperform a buy-and- hold policy on a 
risk-adjusted basis after taking account of commissions. Hence, the results support the 
weak form of the EMH. For the similar studies on emerging markets. Ratner and Leal 
(1998)10 applies 10 Variable Length Moving Average (VMA) models to test the 
effectiveness of technical trading in 10 large emerging equity markets in Asia and 
9 Reilly, Frank K., and Brown, Keith C. Investment Analysis and Portfolio Management ed. 
Fort Worth: ^ryden Press, 2000’ p. 219. 
10 Ratner, Mitchell and Leal, Ricardo. "Emerging Equity Markets of Latin America and Asia." 
Research Paper, Rider University, Lawrenceville, NJ, 1998. 
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Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, India, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Taiwan, and Thailand. Daily inflation adjusted returns for the January 1982 to April 
1995 period are utilized. The findings indicate that VMA trading models do not 
possess widespread ability to profitably forecast future stock price movements in most 
of the emerging markets of this study. 
Results of studies on China's stock market efficiency are mixed. Liu, Song, and 
Romilly (1997)" follow the random walk approach in testing the efficient markets 
hypothesis using daily closing prices from the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges between 21 May 1992 and 18 December 1995. The findings indicate that 
the two stock markets are efficient. Another study (Long, Payne, and Feng, 1999) ^^  
examines market efficiency and the price-volume relation for the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange. One of its results is again that both A- and B-shares follow a random walk 
(with drift), thus supporting EMH for Shanghai. Nevertheless, the main findings of 
recent research by Li and Li (2000) are contrary to previous works that the Chinese 
stock markets are not yet efficient informationally. Also, the government interventions 
in the form of imposing an upper and lower bound on the changes of the stock price 
do not seem to have had adverse effects on market efficiency, but seem to have been 
“ L i u , X.，Song, Haiyan and Romilly, Peter. "Are Chinese Stock markets Efficient? A Cointergration 
and Causality Analysis." Applied Economics Letters. 4 (1997): 511-515. 
12 Feng, Chenyang, Long, Michael. D. and Payne, Janet D. "Information Transmission in the 
Shanghai Equity market." Journal of Financial Research, 22 (1999): 29-45 • 
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conductive to maintaining market stability. 
Finally, many studies on RSI conclude that stock trading based on RSI is unable 
to beat the market. Meissner (2001)^^ carried out a large-scale study on 30 stocks of 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average for a 10-year period from August 1989 to August 
1999. RSI periods from 2 to 30 days have been tested. In addition, RSI signal levels 
from 5 to 50 for buy signals and from 50 to 95 for sell signals were analyzed in five 
unit increments. The results of the RSI indicator were surprisingly unprofitable. 
From the above previous researches, we can infer that the implication for 
technical analysis is quite grim. No technical trading rules like moving average or RSI 
can generate significant profit in most mature and emerging equity markets. On the 
other hands, discussions on China's market efficiency are inconclusive. There is room 
for further research and hence potential for profitable technical trading provided that 
you can choose a "right" trading rule. 





Three types of hypothesis testing have been performed. The first type is used to 
test the abnormal returns derived from trading stock based on RSI levels to verify the 
profitability. The second type is attempted to assess the impact of the deregulation of 
B-share markets on the trading results. The third type is to test the correlation between 
abnormal return and other market data like market value and turnover volume. Strong 
correlation implies that incorporating those factors could enhance the trading model. 
Source of Data 
The sample covers every A-share and B-share in both Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges. Daily closing prices adjusted for dividends and stock splits for 
1,249 stocks (Appendix 4) were obtained from Datastream over the 3-year period 
from January 1，1999 to December 31, 2001 (i.e. 782 trading days). Therefore, the 
study has used 976,718 closing prices to verify each chosen period RSI. 
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Four RSI periods (5，9, 12, 14 days) are chosen for investigation. Shorter RSI 
periods result in a more volatile RSI and consequently more buy and sell signals. RSI 
for each stock in the whole 3-year period is calculated every day using the formula 
stated before. Only one trading decision (i.e. buy, sell or hold) is made for each stock 
each day based on the level of RSI. 
Spreadsheet Calculation Procedure 
We employ spreadsheet to find out the average daily abnormal return resulted 
from all trading decisions based on RSI in the 3-year period for each A-share and 
B-share in the Shanghai and Shenzhen equity markets. 
We first define the trading rules which are set at the RSIs of 30 and 70 
respectively. A buy decision is made when RSI is less than 30, and a sell order is 
placed with RSI more than 70. In cases of RSI between 30 and 70’ no trading decision 
will be required for that day. Daily return for each trading decision is computed and 
compared to daily market return. The difference is the daily abnormal return for that 
trading decision. 
Daily trading return (TR) and market return (MR) are computed using the 
following equations: 
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Where Pj’t is the closing stock price for stock j on day t, MIs.t is the closing index of 
stock market s for the type of stocks which Pj，t belongs. Hence, relevant abnormal 
return (AR) for stock j on day t is: 
ARj,t = TRj,t-MRs,t 
Two things are worth noting: 1) The above calculations are required only when 
the daily RSI is either > 70 or < 30. In other words, there are more likely that TR, MR 
and AR will not be computed for each trading day; 2) The sign of return for successful 
buy decision is different from that of sell decision. 
A buy decision is considered successful if the stock price increases one day after 
the buy signal (i.e. RSI <30). Conversely, a sell trade is considered successful if the 
stock price decreases one day after the sell signal (i.e. RSI >70). We can expect, from 
the above formulas that a successful buy trade will yield positive abnormal return but 
the abnormal return will be negative if a sell trade is successful. In our study, we 
have added a minus sign in the spreadsheet formulas for sell trades' return 
calculations such that successful trades, whether follow buy or sell signals, will 
always give positive trading returns. One-day period is picked due to the short-term 
investing nature in China's stock markets. The outcome is the daily abnormal return 
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for each buy or sell trade, which may be positive, negative or zero. The unit is in 
percentage. 
The average daily abnormal returns for sell trades and buy trades are then 
determined separately. For example, the average daily abnormal return for sell (buy) 
trades is calculated by dividing the sum of daily abnormal returns resulted from all 
sell (buy) trades that happened in the past 3 years by the total number of sell (buy) 
trades within period. That means each stock has two average daily abnormal returns 
(one from buy signals and one from sell signals), which are the observations for the 
hypothesis testing. Finally, the process is repeated four times for four different 
periods of RSI for each stock. 
Since these average daily abnormal returns can be positive, negative or zero, a 
hypothesis testing is essential if we want to draw a conclusion on the profitability of 
using RSI as a trading rule. As the population variance is not known, t-test is usually 
applied. 
Hypothesis Testing 
The First Type of Tests 
The first type is to test the abnormal returns obtained by following RSI trading 
rules. Let fi be the hypothesized sample mean of abnormal return derived from trading 
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stocks for 3-year period using n-day RSI which is set at 0. The null and alternative 
hypotheses are as follows: 
Ho： n = 0 
Hi: /z 0 
A two-tailed t-test with a 5 percent level of significance (i.e. alpha) is applied 
here. If the null hypothesis is rejected, we can conclude that using RSI trading rules in 
the three years could either beat the market or perform worse than market. The tests 
for buy signals (buy-and-then-sell rule) are carried out separately from those for sell 
signals (sell-and-then-buy rule). 
The Second Type of Tests 
As previously mentioned, the Chinese Government has been enforcing a series of 
measures to extend the investor base. One of the most important steps was to allow 
local people investing in B-share markets. This deregulation was taken on February 
19，2001. Since relaxation of restrictions may attract more investors and hence 
improve market efficiency，the second type of tests is aimed at estimating the impact 
on RSI trading result. This can easily be done by repeating the above tests twice, 
each with different time frames. One test was done for the period from January 1， 
1999 to January 31, 2001 and another is done for the period from February 1, 2001 to 
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December 31，2001. Any significant differences in the t-statistics between two time 
frames could be attributed to the consequences of deregulation. Only B-share 
markets were tested. 
The Third Type of Tests 
Trading stocks based solely on RSI levels are rather simple. There might exist 
other factors or indicators that could help to attain better results if they were 
considered in trading stocks using RSI. We chose volume turnover and market value 
as the potential candidates, partly because they are already available from the 
Datastream. The hypothesis testing required is: 
Ho： Pearson Correlation = 0 
Hi： Pearson Correlation共0 
It is a series of tests on the correlation between the average abnormal return and 
volume turnover (or market value of the relevant company) for each stock in A-share 
markets. Should the p-values be smaller than alpha (0.05), we can reject the null 
hypothesis and conclude that the factor has correlation to abnormal return. The value 
of Pearson Correlation also shows how two variables relate (positively or negatively 




Abnormal Returns Obtained by Following RSI Trading Rules 
By following the buy signals and sell signals of the 14-day RSI, 12-day RSI, 
9-day RSI and 5-day RSI trading rules, abnormal returns were tested whether they 
deviated from zero or not. The results are shown below. A-share markets are 
illustrated first, followed by B-share markets. A summary of research findings about 
RSI trading rules is shown in Appendix 5. 
A-shares 
Buy signals 
Regarding the buy signals, the results of Shanghai and Shenzhen markets are 
similar. All buy signals did not work. For Shanghai market, p-values of 14-day 
RSI，12-day RSI, 9-day RSI and 5-day RSI trading rules are 0.910, 0.501，0.326 and 
0.511 respectively. As they are all larger than our alpha (0.05), the average abnormal 
returns therefore do not significantly deviate from zero. The null hypothesis is not 
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rejected, i.e. there is no evidence showing the trading rules could have positive or 
negative abnormal returns. 
For Shenzhen market, the findings are similar to Shanghai market. P-values of 
14-day RSI，12-day RSI, 9-day RSI and 5-day RSI trading rules are 0.884, 0.565, 
0.182 and 0.817 respectively. As they are all larger than alpha, the expected returns 
do not significantly deviate from zero. The null hypothesis is not rejected, i.e. there 
is no evidence showing the trading rules could have positive or negative abnormal 
returns. 
Interpretations of buy signals in A-share markets 
As we mentioned above, for A-share of both Shanghai and Shenzhen markets, all 
buy signals did not work. It implies that Chinese investors did not interpret the stock 
as cheap or worthy to buy, even when the stocks were oversold. Chinese investors 
just ignored the oversold stocks. 
Sell signals 
However, the tests on sell signals give us encouraging results. The findings of 
Shanghai and Shenzhen markets are also similar. All sell signals worked except sell 
signals of 5-day RSI trading rules. 
For Shanghai market, p-values of 14-day RSI, 12-day RSI, 9-day RSI and 5-day 
RSI trading rules are 0.000，0.000，0.000 and 0.000 respectively. They are all 
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smaller than alpha, the average abnormal returns therefore significantly deviate from 
zero. The null hypothesis is rejected. T-statistics of 14-day RSI, 12-day RSI and 
9-day RSI trading rules are all positive numbers. It shows that the average abnormal 
returns are significantly greater than zero if these three sell signals are followed. 
However, t-statistic of 5-day RSI trading rule is -4.814, which is negative. It shows 
that the average abnormal returns are significantly smaller than zero if this sell signal 
is used. 
For Shenzhen market, p-values of 14-day RSI, 12-day RSI, 9-day RSI and 5-day 
RSI trading rules are 0.000, 0.000, 0.026 and 0.000 respectively. They are all 
smaller than alpha. The average abnormal returns significantly deviate from zero 
and thus the null hypothesis is rejected. Similar to Shanghai market, t-statistics of 
14-day RSI, 12- day RSI and 9-day RSI trading rules are all positive. It shows that 
the average abnormal returns are significantly greater than zero if these three sell 
signals are followed. However, t-statistic of 5-day RSI trading rule is -6.100, which 
is negative. It shows that the average abnormal returns are significantly smaller than 
0 if this sell signal is followed. 
Interpretations of sell signals in A-share markets 
For A-share of both Shanghai and Shenzhen markets, we found that the 14-day, 
12-day and 9-day RSI sell signals work effectively. It implies that Chinese investors 
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sold the stocks when the stocks were overbought. To explain why Chinese investors 
ignored oversold stocks but paid attention to overbought stocks, one of the 
possibilities is the news effect. When a stock was oversold, its price was relatively 
low. Financial news always reported stocks that boomed a lot. It therefore drew 
investors' attentions from poorly performed stocks to well performed stocks. 
Investors thus paid more attentions to the overbought stock, and the trading volume 
was naturally higher. Once the stock price looked too expensive, or overbought, 
investors would then sell to secure profits. The large sell force pushed the price 
down, with magnitude larger than movement of market index. Therefore investors 
could earn positive abnormal return by selling upon sell signals. 
In this research, we also observed the sell signals worked in both Shanghai 
A-share market and Shenzhen A-share market. 
However, one interesting finding is about the 5-day signals here. If investors 
had followed the 5-day RSI sell signals to sell, they would have negative abnormal 
returns significantly because our t-statistics are negative here. Our explanation here 
is about the strength of index. As "5-day" is a relatively short period, it does not 
represent a strong enough sell force or buy force. The 5-day signal is therefore not 
so meaningftil here. Trend of rising price or dropping price may or may not end in 
such a short period. We thus ignore the findings regarding 5-day signals here. 
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B-shares 
We separate B-share markets from A-share markets and the findings are 
illustrated below. 
Buy signals 
For B-share markets, the results of using buy signals are different from that of 
the A-share markets. 
For Shanghai B-share market, all buy signals worked. P-values of 14-day RSI, 
12-day RSI, 9-day RSI and 5-day RSI trading rules are 0.000, 0.000，0.000 and 0.000 
respectively. The null hypothesis is rejected. T-statistics are all positive. It shows 
that the average abnormal returns are significantly greater than zero. 
For Shenzhen B-share market, all buy signals worked too. P-values of 14-day 
RSI, 12-day RSI, 9-day RSI and 5-day RSI trading rules are 0.005, 0.011，0.040 and 
0.016 respectively. The null hypothesis is rejected. T-statistics are all positive. It 
shows that the average abnormal returns are significantly greater than zero. 
Interpretations of buy signals in B-share markets 
For buy signals in B-share markets, the findings are quite different from A-share 
markets. All buy signals worked in both Shanghai and Shenzhen B-share markets. 
It means that Chinese investors usually paid attentions to whether the stocks in 
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B-share markets were cheap or not. Once they judged the stocks in B-shares markets 
were oversold, they bought and then pushed up the prices. It turned out the price rise 
was greater than market performance. They thus obtained positive abnormal returns. 
However, there must be some reasons of such a difference in behavior between 
A-share markets and B-share markets. It seemed that investors created more buy 
force in B-share markets than A-share markets. We will explain this phenomenon 
after the discussion of sell signals in B-share markets as below. 
Sell signals 
For sell signals in Shanghai B-share market, p-values of 14-day RSI, 12-day RSI, 
9-day RSI and 5-day RSI trading rules are 0.000，0.000，0.000 and 0.000 respectively. 
The hypothesis is rejected. However, t-statistics are all negative. It gives negative 
average abnormal returns if these four sell signals are followed. Interestingly, the 
magnitudes of these t-statistics are far greater than those of buy signals and those of 
the A-share markets. T-statistics of 14-day RSI, 12-day RSI, 9-day RSI and 5-day 
RSI trading rules are -24.667, -25.058，-23.676 and -22.567 respectively, while the 
same t-statistics of A-share markets are 6.763, 6.855, 5.039 and -4.814 
correspondingly. 
For sell signals in Shenzhen B-share market, the situation is similar to Shanghai 
B-share market. P-values of 14-day RSI, 12-day RSI, 9-day RSI and 5-day RSI 
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trading rules are 0.000, 0.000，0.000 and 0.000 respectively. The null hypothesis is 
rejected. However, t-statistics are all negative too. It gives negative average 
abnormal returns if these four sell signals are followed. Magnitudes of these 
t-statistics are also far greater than those of buy signals and those of A-share markets. 
T-statistics of 14-day RSI, 12-day RSI, 9-day RSI and 5-day RSI trading rules 
are -26.287, -27.078, -23.782 and -28.433 respectively. 
Interpretations of sell signals in B-share markets 
Now we look at the sell signals in B-share markets. Interestingly, the sell 
signals did not work properly, i.e. following sell signals could not generate positive 
abnormal returns. If investors had followed the sell signals to sell，they would 
significantly obtain negative abnormal returns. It implies that, when the stock price 
was overbought according to RSI sell signals, people still bought the stock to push up 
the price further higher. The buy force was still large even the stocks were already 
expensive. 
We can also describe it in another way. The RSI sell signals in B-share markets 
were actually effective "buy signals" for investors. If investors bought according to 
the RSI sell signals in B-share markets, they would obtain positive abnormal returns. 
Now we can put two pictures together and analyze. Whichever signal it is (buy 
signal or sell signal), investors still bought the stocks and pushed up the price to 
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obtain positive abnormal returns. 
Some people may explain all these by the booming economy in China. Since 
investors were optimistic in the economic development of China, they tended to do 
more buy actions than sell actions. This could be one of the reasons. However, it 
still could not explain why this phenomenon just happened in B-share markets, but 
not in A-share markets. 
We believe the main reason must be related to the characteristics of B-share 
markets. One of the possible explanations is "expectation of the merge of A- and 
B-share markets". In February 19, 2001, China governments started to allow local 
investors to participate in B-share markets. This not only increased the volume 
turnover in B-share markets, but also gave investors a signal of the future trend of 
B-share markets. Investors interpreted the deregulation of B-share markets as the 
first step of merging B-share markets with A-share markets in foreseeable years. 
Before the deregulation, B-share prices were far lower than A-share prices. After the 
deregulation, investors may foresee a rising trend of B-share prices because of the 
existing big gap between A-share prices and B-share prices. They therefore 
interpreted the B-shares as cheap. Even the prices rose after they bought them 
continuously and the RSI passed over 70, investors still thought the prices were too 
cheap comparing with A-shares. As RSI measures whether the stock is cheap or 
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expensive only by its past data trend without considering the price gap between 
B-share and A-share, RSI could not effectively reflect the sell force and buy force of 
B-shares. This is why investors kept on buying regardless the RSI sell signals. 
Not only the inversely works of sell signals give us the above intuition, we can 
also get some insights from the magnitude of abnormal returns. From Appendix 5, it 
is found that the absolute values of t-statistics of sell signals in B-share markets are far 
greater than A-share markets. It means that the abnormal returns of using sell 
signals to buy in B-share markets are far higher than in A-share markets. The 
possible reason of that may be the "expectation" effect mentioned above. 
In order to ftirther prove the impact of the deregulation of B-share markets started 
from February 2001, we did an additional research on B-share to investigate. 
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CHAPTER V 
ADDITIONAL RESEARCHES ON B-SHARE MARKETS 
The objective of the additional researches on B-share markets is to prove 
whether the deregulation was the cause of the strange behavior of B-share markets. 
The research is simple. We just repeated the above research twice, but with different 
time frames. One was done for the period from 1 Jan 1999 to 31 Jan 2001. 
Another was done for the period from 1 Feb 2001 to 31 Dec 2001. The two periods 
represent the period before deregulation announcement and the period after 
deregulation announcement. (We picked 1 Feb 2001 instead of 19 Feb 2001 because 
we assumed there was some news leakage several weeks before official 
announcement.) These researches were conducted on the B-share markets only. 
Findings on Additional Researches on B-share Markets 
The findings were listed in Appendix 6. When we compare the magnitudes of 
t-statistics of the period before and the period after February 1, 2001, we can see a big 
difference. Before February 1，2001, the t-statistics are around -8 to -15. On or 
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after February 1, 2001, the t-statistics are around -23 to -33. It shows the impact of 
the time frame is critical to the magnitudes of t-statistics. 
Interpretations of Findings on Additional Researches on B-share Markets 
The magnitudes of t-statistics can be interpreted as a measurement of the 
magnitudes of abnormal returns when the sell signals were used as "buy signals". 
The difference of t-statistics of the two periods indicates that investors created higher 
expectation after the deregulation in February 2001. After the announcement of 
deregulation, investors expected prices of B-shares would rise until they got closed to 
A-shares. The strong buy force pushed the stock prices up. This buy force was 
much stronger than before the deregulation. Therefore the abnormal returns after 
deregulation were higher than before. 
This deregulation also explained why the overall abnormal returns of B-shares 
(using both signals as "buy signals”）in the three years are higher than that of A-shares; 
even the abnormal returns were all generated by our RSI trading rules. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ADDITIONAL RESEARCHES ON A-SHARE MARKETS 
Up to this moment, we have studied the workability of the RSI trading rules. 
Let us have a small conclusion here. For A-share markets, buy signals did not work. 
Sell signals worked. For B-share markets, buy signals worked. Sell signals worked 
in the way if investors treated the sell signals as "buy signals". The abnormal returns 
were higher in B-share markets than in A-share markets if investors knew how to use 
our RSI trading rules. Higher abnormal returns in B-share markets were due to the 
deregulation of the B-share markets in February 2001. 
However, practitioners usually do not use RSI trading rules alone to make 
investment decisions. Better performance could be achieved if RSI were used with 
other indicators or factors. Therefore, we further did tests on two more factors. We 
would like to find out whether these two factors also have any impacts on the 
abnormal returns. The two factors we picked were volume turnover and market 
value. 
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Correlation between Abnormal Return and Volume Turnover 
We picked volume turnover as a factor because we predicted there would be 
relation between trading volume and abnormal returns obtained under our RSI trading 
rules. It is because different number of market participants may lead to difference in 
effectiveness of technical analysis trading rules, including our RSI trading rules. 
Therefore, we studied the correlation between abnormal returns obtained by our RSI 
trading rules and volume turnover of the stocks. Our null hypothesis is: 
Pearson Correlation = 0. 
Findings on Correlation between Abnormal Return and Volume Turnover 
The findings on correlation tests are shown in Appendix 7. No correlation exists 
between abnormal return and volume turnover. All p-values are greater than alpha 
(0.05). Pearson correlations do not significantly deviate from zero. We do not reject 
the null hypothesis. 
Interpretations of Findings on Correlation between 
Abnormal Return and Volume Turnover 
The finding of zero correlation between abnormal return and volume turnover 
implies that volume turnover does not have any impact on the abnormal returns 
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obtained by our RSI trading rules. Volume turnover does not help us to better use 
the RSI trading rules because volume turnover is an unrelated factor. 
Correlation between Abnormal Return and Market Value 
Another factor we picked was market value of firm. As we predicted size of 
firm (market value of firm) could be related to its growth rate expectation. Investors 
may expect lower growth rates for bigger firms and higher growth rates for smaller 
firms. In order to investigate whether there was any true relation between abnormal 
return and market value, we did the test on correlation again, but the two variables are 
"abnormal return" and market value. Our null hypothesis is: 
Pearson Correlation = 0. 
Findings on Correlation between Abnormal Return and Market Value 
The results are shown in Appendix 8. For buy signals, only the abnormal return 
obtained by using 9-day RSI buy signal in Shanghai A-share market has correlation 
with market value with p-value smaller than our alpha (0.05). All other correlations do 
not deviate from zero. 
For sell signals, all the p-values are smaller than alpha. It implies that there is 
correlation between abnormal return and market value. The correlations 
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significantly deviate from zero. The null hypothesis is rejected. 
Looking at the magnitudes of correlations, it is found that the absolute values of 
correlations are overall low, which are around 0.14 to 0.24. Correlations are positive 
in Shanghai market but negative in Shenzhen. 
Interpretations of Findings on Correlation between 
Abnormal Return and Market Value 
For the buy signals, although the correlation for 9-day RSI in Shanghai A-share 
market is larger than zero, we do not draw any conclusion here. It is because the 
abnormal return obtained by using RSI buy signals in Shanghai A-share market does 
not significantly deviate from zero. The buy signals have no impact on the abnormal 
return here. The correlation here is therefore meaningless to our research. 
However, for the sell signal side, the results are interesting. We have to look at 
Shanghai A-share market and Shenzhen A-share market separately because the signs 
of Pearson correlations of Shanghai A-share market are different from the signs of 
Pearson correlations of Shenzhen A-share market. For Shanghai, the correlation is 
positive. For Shenzhen, the correlation is negative. Both are significant, with 
p-values smaller than alpha. 
For Shanghai A-share market, the correlation between abnormal return and 
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market value is positive. It means that, when the sell signals were followed, the 
abnormal return would be higher if the market value of firm is higher. We can also 
say in another way: By following the sell signals to sell, the price of the stock sold 
would drop more if the firm were bigger. 
For Shenzhen A-share market, the correlation between abnormal return and 
market value is negative. It means that, when the sell signals were followed, the 
abnormal return would be lower if the market value of firm is higher. We can also 
say in another way: By following the sell signals to sell, the price of the stock sold 
would drop less if the firm were bigger. 
We cannot explain this strange phenomenon. However, given that the 
magnitudes of correlations here are small, the correlations are therefore weak. Only 
very small portion of abnormal return is related to (or can be explained by) market 
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signals worked. For B-share markets, RSI buy signals worked. RSI sell signals 
worked if investors treated the sell signals as "buy signals". In this sense, RSI is 
currently a satisfactory trading rule in China market. This research also shows that 
technical analysis works in China market. The China stock market is not weak form 
efficient. 
The impact of relaxation of trading restriction on RSI trading profits can be 
proven significant by tests on the abnormal returns for the period before and the 
period after February 1，2001. It demonstrates how changes in investing 
environment can alter RSI trading strategies and results. Current market trend and 
situation should be carefiilly considered in applying RSI. For example, in a strong 
up-trending market, there could be consecutive overbought signals. Short-selling 
stocks in the first overbought signal may result in tremendous loss. This is exactly the 
case for B-shares market from February to June, 2001 (Appendix 9). 
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Volume turnover does not have any relationship with abnormal return. Market 
value of firm has very small correlation with abnormal return. Anyway, without 
considering volume turnover and market value or other indicators, our RSI trading 




There are several operational issues of RSI that may have significant effect on the 
validity of the research findings. 
First, the testing period is limited to the past three years. The choice of a longer or 
shorter testing period may render the findings totally different. Moreover, trading 
rules proved to be workable may or may not also work in the future several years 
because China's equity markets are emerging markets whose investing environment 
has been changing rapidly from year to year. The ramifications of government 
interventions on stock market behavior are particularly critical. An example can be 
seen in the period immediately after February 19, 2001 when the CSRC announced 
that domestic investors with legal foreign exchange accounts would be allowed to 
trade B-shares. This aroused an imminent expectation of a possible merger of A- and 
B- share markets among markets participants and caused sudden upsurge in B-shares 
which have long been sold at a discount to the A-shares. As the creditability of 
technical analysis often rests on the central theme that history repeats itself, this 
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non-stationarity of investing environment may make technical analysts difficult to 
search for recognized price patterns and profitable RSI may easily lose its validity. 
Therefore, strictly following our trading rules to trade in the China market in the 
coming years may be very dangerous. Users must be careful about the changes in 
China market environment and use our trading rules together with other judgment 
tools. 
Second, the settings of RSI level more than 70 as overbought signal and RSI level 
less than 30 as oversold are somewhat arbitrary. Other combinations such as 80-20 
may be more appropriate but they have not been tested in our research. 
Third, the surging B-shares market started from February 2001 discloses the 
weakness of applying RSI in probing direction of price movement in a trending 
market. During that period, continuously losses would have been resulted if sell 
orders were placed when there were overbought signals. It is because stock prices 
are more probably to rise (fell) than to fall (rise) in a rising (falling) market trend even 
there are RSI sell (buy) signals. Therefore RSI should be used only when the market 
is neither strong bull nor strong bear. 
Finally, since RSI signals may prevail with a longer time frame in bearish or 
bullish market, the compulsory holding period of one day after placing a trading order 
is unrealistic. Research with other appropriate exit signals or different holding 
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periods may have different results. Also transaction costs are not taken into account 
in our research. Whether the abnormal return would be less after considering 
transaction costs is a question. 
4 2 
CHAPTER IX 
FURTHER STUDIES RECOMMENDED 
Based on the above operational limitations on RSI, further studies on the 
following directions may provide more insights on the feasibility of RSI as a trading 
rule in China market. 
This research focuses only on equity market. Similar testing on other markets 
(e.g. futures, bonds and other derivatives) can also be done，especially to those 
products whose markets are rather stable like gold. This can help to prove whether 
RSI is universally applicable in China. In addition, since the merger of A- and B-
shares markets are now foreseeable, the investigation as well as comparison of the 
results from trading on RSI in the following years may give more useful information 
on how the reduction on trading restriction (i.e. improvement in market efficiency) in 
investing environment would affect the results of technical trading rules. 
Furthermore, the trading rules have taken for granted on some arbitrary inputs 
like testing period, exit time, overbought and oversold levels of RSI. It is 
recommended that different values of these inputs can be tested to find out if more 
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optimal results can be achieved. Different level of transaction costs can also be 
taken into account, so that the results can be more realistic. 
Finally, combined application of RSI with other technical tools like charts or 
other market data like block trades does not only better the trading result but also 
more mimic the realistic practice of the technician. This is the reason why we 
performed the correlation tests in our project as an attempt to dig out those helpful 
data. Further research on versatile uses of RSI may enhance the trading model 
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APPENDIX 1 
SOME IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT MEASURES TO EXTEND 
INVESTOR BASE IN EQUITY MARKETS 
Year / Period Policies taken 
Between May 1, 1996 - The People's Bank of China (PBGC) has lowered interest 
June 10, 1999 earned on bank deposits seven times in an attempt to shift 
banking saving to investment in stock markets. Rates for 
1-year deposit were lowered from 9.16% to 2.25%. 
In 1999 20% tax was imposed on bank interest payment as a 
further effort to move out saving. 
Banks were allowed to take shares as collateral against 
personal bank loans. 
Joint Sino - foreign securities funds were allowed to invest 
in B shares. 
Stamp duty charged on B shares stock transactions was 
lowered from 0.4% to 0.3%. 
Some restrictions on investments in stock markets by 
mutual funds were lessened to boost institutional 
investments. 
“ State-owned legal person shares were tradable so long as 
the State maintained the largest single interest in any listed 
state-owned enterprise. 
In 2000 “ CSRS approved the reorganization of the China Futures 
Association to increase depth and maturity of China's 
capital market. 
Foreign partners in firms listed on the B share market were 
allowed to trade their stakes. 
The government did share buy-back for some companies 
whose stocks had plummeted. 
In 2001 Local investors who had legal foreign exchange accounts 
before February 19, 2001 were allowed to trade in B 
shares. 
In 2002 The PBOC cut deposit rates again by an average of 25 
basis points. The rate on ordinary savings account was 
reduced to 0.72% from 0.99% and the rate for five-year 
time deposits was cut to 2.79%. The benchmark one-year 
[fixed deposit rate was reduced by 27 basis points to 1.98%. 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. China hand: investing, licensing, and trading 




COMPOSITION OF INVESTOR ACCOUNTS AT THE YEAR-END 1999 
(UNIT: MILLION) 
Shanghai Stock Shenzhen Stock Total Percentage 
Exchange Exchange of the total 
Institutional 8.32 11.47 19.79 0.4416% 
accounts 
Individual 2,272.80 2,189.38 4,462.18 99.5584% 
accounts 
Total 2,281.12 2,200.85 4,481.97 100% 
Source:康榮寶.深入中國股市.台灣：天下文化書坊，2001, p. 40.. 
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APPENDIX 1 
CATEGORIZATION OF PRINCIPAL SHARE TYPES (UNIT MILLION) 
一 1998 1999 2000 
Shares as yet 
untraded 
.. Promoter shares, 
including: 1,429.33 1,747.09 2,165.40 
1. State owned shares 865.51 1,116.07 一 1,475.13 
ii.Domestic legal 
person shares 528.06 590.51 642.55 
iii.Foreign capital legal 46.20 
person shares 35.77 40.51 
iv.Other s ~ 0 0 1.53 
2. Social legal person 
shares 152.34 190.10 214.21 
3. Internal Staff shares 51.70 36.71 24.29 
4. Others 31.47 33.20 24.65 
Total non-tradable 1,664.84 2,007.19 2,437.43 
% of the total 65% — 64% 
Shares already traded: 
1 .Domestically listed 
RMB common shares 608.03 813.18 1,078.17 
2. Domestically listed 
foreign capital shares 133.96 141.92 151.57 
• 3. Overseas listed 
foreign capital shares 119.95 124.54 124.54 
Total tradable 861.94 1079.64 1,354；^ 
% of the total 34% ^ 36% 




DOMESTIC STOCK EXCHANGES: AGGREGATE LISTINGS 
AT THE END OF 2001 
Shenzhen Shanghai 
A-share listings 504 636 




TEST OF ABNORMAL RETURNS OBTAINED BY THE TRADING RULES 
FOR BUY AND SELL SIGNALS IN THE PAST 3-YEAR PERIOD 
Null hypothesis: n = 0 
Alternative hypothesis: n^ O^ 
Shanghai A-share buy signal: 
— 14-day RSI 12-day RSI 9-day RSI 5-day RSI 
p-value 0.910 0.326 0.511 
t-statistic — 0.114 -0.673 -0.982 0.658 
mean 2.024E-05 -1.119E-04 -1.553E-04 9.020E-05 
Shenzhen A-share buy signal: 
14-day RSI 12-day RSI 9-day RSI 5-day RSI 
p-value 0.884 0.565 0.182 0.817 
t-statistic — 0.146 -0.576 -1.336 — -0.232 
mean 2.058E-05 -7.183E-05 -1.364E-04 -1.746E-05 
Shanghai A-share sell signal: 
14-day RSI 12-day RSI 9-day RSI 5-day RSI — 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
t-statistic 6.763 6.855 5.039 -4.814 
"mean 2.263E-03 2.013E-03 1.140E-03 -6.777E-04 
Shenzhen A-share sell signal: 
14-day RSI 12-day RSI 9-day RSI 5-day RSI 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.000 
t-statistic — 4.141 4.128 — 2.227 -6.100 
mean 1.761E-03 1.532E-03 6.139E-04 -9.989E-04 
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Shanghai B-share buy signal: 
14-day RSI 12-day RSI 9-day RSI 5-day RSI 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
t-statistic 8.756 “ 9.636 12.345 13.243 
mean 8.410E-03 7.184E-03 6.396E-03 5.709E-03 
Shenzhen B-share buy signal: 
- 14-day RSI 12-day RSI 9-day RSI 5-day RSI 
p-value 0.005 0.011 0.040 0.016 
t-statistic 2.915 “ 2.617 2.108 2.496 
mean 2.471E-03 1.938E-03 1.205E-03 1.230E-03 
Shanghai B-share sell signal: 
14-day RSI 12-day RSI 9-day RSI 5-day RSI 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
t-statistic — -24.667 _ -25.058 -23.676 -22.567 
mean -1.499E-02 -1.499E-02 -1.474E-02 -1.135E-02 
Shenzhen B-share sell signal: 
14-day RSI 12-day RSI 9-day RSI 5-day RSI “ 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
t-statistic -26.287 -27.078 -23.782 -28.433 
mean -2.769E-02 -2.667E-02 -2.335E-02 -1.775E-02 _ 
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APPENDIX 1 
COMPARISON OF THE TEST RESULTS OF ABNORMAL RETURNS 
OBTAINED BY THE TRADING RULES BEFORE 
AND AFTER 1 FEBRUARY 2001 
BEFORE 1 February 2001 
Shanghai B-share sell signal 
14-day RSI 12-day RSI 9-(iay RSI 5-day RSI 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
t-statistic — -8.185 -10.247 -11.606 -13.651 ~ 
mean -9.335E-03 -9.853E-03 -1.026E-02 -8.015E-03 
Shenzhen B-share sell signal 
— 14-day RSI 12-day RSI 9-day RSI 5-day RSI 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
t-statistic — -13.261 -13.868 -12.891 -15.463 
mean -1.567E-02 -1.504E-02 -1.294E-02 -UOOE-02 
ON or AFTER 1 February 2001 
Shanghai B-share sell signal 
14-day RSI 12-day RSI 9-day RSI 5-day RSI — 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
t-statistic ~ ~ -25.635 -27.602 -33.081 -27.560 
mean -1.900E-02 -1.945E-02 -2.118E-02 -1.757E-02 一 
Shenzhen B-share sell signal 
14-day RSI 12-day RSI 9-day RSI 5-day RSI 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
t-statistic — -23.494 -25.355 -25.575 -27.462 
mean -4.358E-02 -4.291E-02 -4.279E-02 -3.260E-02 
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APPENDIX 1 
TESTS OF CORRLATIONS BETWEEN "VOLUME TURNOVERS" AND 
"ABNORMAL RETURNS" OBTAINED BY THE TRADING RULES 
Null hypothesis: Pearson Correlation = 0 
Alternative hypothesis: Pearson Correlation 半 0 
Shanghai A-share market: 
Pearson Correlation p-value 
Following 14-day RSI trading rule buy signals 0.037 0.572 
Following 12-day RSI trading rule buy signals ~~ 0.061 0.352 
Following 9-day RSI trading rule buy signals 0.055 0.403 
Following 5-day RSI trading rule buy signals — 0.058 0.374 
Following 14-day RSI trading rule sell signals -0.015 — 0.822 
Following 12-day RSI trading rule sell signals — -0.022 0.733 
Following 9-day RSI trading rule sell signals -0.015 “ 0.816 
Following 5-day RSI trading rule sell signals 0.016 0.801 
Shenzhen A-share market: 
Pearson Correlation p-value 
Following 14-day RSI trading rule buy signals -0.013 0.778 
Following 12-day RSI trading rule buy signals -0.030 0.505 
Following 9-day RSI trading rule buy signals -0.031 “ 0.502 
Following 5-day RSI trading rule buy signals -0.039 0.399 
Following 14-day RSI trading rule sell signals -0.014 “ 0.758 
Following 12-day RSI trading rule sell signals -0.019 ~ 0.682 
Following 9-day RSI trading rule sell signals 0.011 ~0.816 
Following 5-dai RSI trading rule sell signals -0.023 0.608— 
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APPENDIX 1 
TESTS OF CORRLATIONS BETWEEN "MARKET VALUES" AND 
"ABNORMAL RETURNS" OBTAINED BY THE 
TRADING RULES 
Null hypothesis: Pearson Correlation = 0 
Alternative hypothesis: Pearson Correlation 丰 0 
Shanghai A-share market: 
Pearson Correlation p-value 
Following 14-day RSI trading rule buy signals 0.004 0.952 
Following 12-day RSI trading rule buy signals 0.031 0.639 
Following 9-day RSI trading rule buy signals 0.253 0.000 
Following 5-day RSI trading rule buy signals 0.122 0.061 
Following 14-day RSI trading rule sell signals 0.156 0.017 
Following 12-day RSI trading rule sell signals 0.238 0.000 
Following 9-day RSI trading rule sell signals 0.162 0.013 
Following 5-day RSI trading rule sell signals 0.144 | 0.027 
Shenzhen A-share market: 
Pearson Correlation p-value 
Following 14-day RSI trading rule buy signals -0-025 0.578 
Following 12-day RSI trading rule buy signals -0.036 0.428 
Following 9-day RSI trading rule buy signals -0.056 0.224 
Following 5-day RSI trading rule buy signals -0.081 0.077 
Following 14-day RSI trading rule sell signals -0.172 0.000 
Following 12-day RSI trading rule sell signals -0.172 0.000 
Following 9-day RSI trading rule sell signals -0.152 0.001 
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